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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
PRESSURE VESSELS 
By G l e n n  M. Ecord 
Manned Spacecraft Center  
SUMMARY 
Apollo spacecraft pressure vessels were designed using safety factors as low as 
1. 5 to save weight. The relatively low safety factors, combined with the criticality of 
a vessel failure, required that stringent fabrication requirements and controls be main- 
tained throughout the vessel  programs to ensure production of quality vessels. Addi- 
tionally, posffabrication analytical techniques were introduced to confirm and control 
safe vessel  operation. 
No problems were experienced that were a direct result of reduced safety-factor 
levels. Major vessel  problems involved isolated instances of materials incompatibility 
with pressurants, of inadequate process control, and of materials anomalies. However, 
it has been shown that reduced safety factors may increase the susceptibility of mate- 
rials to s t r e s s  corrosion or  incompatibility problems. 
The resolution of each problem provided a resultant increase in the knowledge 
necessary to ensure safe operation as reflected in several  recommendations concerning 
design, fabrication, use, and management of lightweight pressure vessels. Specific 
identification and assignment of responsibility for spacecraft pressure vessels was nec- 
essary to accomplish effective control of vessel fabrication and use. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Apollo spacecraft pressure vessels comprise a significant part of the dry 
structural  weight of the spacecraft. Seventy-one vessels are used in the command 
module (CM), service module (SM), and lunar module (LM); the launch escape system 
(LES) uses  three rocket motor cases that become pressurized when fired. Each of the 
vessels constitutes a potential single failure point for critical subsystems and contains 
stored energy at operating pressures that could be catastrophic to the spacecraft should 
rupture occur. 
Historically, high safety factors (ratio of design burst pressure to maximum de- 
sign operating pressure)  have been used in the design of commercial pressure vessels 
to compensate for  unknowns in pressure-vessel fabrication and service. A safety 
factor of 4 .0  was considered a minimum. In the early 1960's, the U. S. Air Force de- 
veloped a new technology for fabrication methods and materials control by means of 
stringent specification requirements that minimized r isk and justified a safety factor of 
2.0 fo r  pressure vessels used in high-performance aircraft. 
Safety factors of 2 .0  on some pressure vessels used in the Apollo spacecraft sys- 
tems became impracticable because of the associated weight penalty. As a result, sev- 
e ra l  Apollo pressure vessels were designed to a minimum safety factor of 1. 5. This 
unprecedented minimum safety factor for  vessels in manned systems combined with the 
criticality of a vessel  failure required that every known precaution be taken in fabrica- 
tion and use to ensure safe vessel operation. Despite the precautions, a few failures 
and related probleiris were experienced. The resolution of these problems and the steps 
taken to preclude recurrence, including the introduction of additional precautions and 
the application of fracture-mechanics technology in postfabrication analysis, are dis- 
cussed in this report. 
DES I GN AND TEST 
Design data and other pertinent information for Apollo spacecraft pressure ves- 
sels a r e  presented in tables I and 11. Many of the larger or  more numerous vessels 
have safety factors as low as 1 .5  to achieve a lightweight structure. The locations and 
uses  of many of the vessels throughout the spacecraft a r e  shown in figures 1 to 9. The 
assimilation of pressure vessels in the spacecraft design and the relationship to space- 
craft operation a r e  illustrated in those figures. 
The Apollo spacecraft was designed and built in Block I and Block I1 configurations 
for  the command and service modules. Essentially, Block I vehicles did not contain all 
the systems necessary for docking and lunar flight and were used unmanned to qualify 
various Apollo subsystems. Block I1 vehicles were fully configured for manned lunar 
missions. For the Block I1 configurations, some minor changes were made in the 
pressure-vessel designs for the service propulsion system (SPS), and vessel additions 
were made to the SM reaction control systems (RCS). Generally, the SPS helium and 
propellant vessels maintained the same overall dimensions and operating s t resses ,  but 
operating pressures and wall thickness were reduced. Materials and processes re-  
mained the same. Two vessels were added to each SM RCS panel to provide additional 
RCS capacity for  the Block I1 configuration. These additional vessels were of the same 
design as the CM RCS vessels. 
Rigorous qualification tests (vibration, shock, acceleration, pressure cycling, 
and burst) were performed on production vessels of each type to demonstrate attainment 
of design requirements. The tests performed on each vessel are identified in table ID. 
In some cases, the qualification of Block I vessels sufficed for Block I1 configuration. 
Each qualification vessel was given a nondestructive test  (NDT) evaluation and was ac- 
ceptance tested (proof pressurization and leak test) before the qualification test, as all 
production vessels have been tested before delivery. Subsequently, the number of pres- 
surizations, the fluids, the pressure levels, and the temperatures have been controlled 
to ensure safe test conditions and adequate flight capability. This control has been ac- 
complished by means of the regulation of spacecraft- systems tes ts  involving vessel 
pressurizations through the application of fracture-mechanics criteria. 
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TABLE I. - APOLLO COMMANU AND SERVICE MODULE P-RE VESSELS 
Pressure "I 
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Figure 1. - Command module reaction 
control system vessels. 
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Figure 3. - Typical service module 
reaction control system quad 
vessels - Block 11. 
Rapid repressurization tanks 
Figure 2. - Command module environ- 
mental control system oxygen supply 
vessels. 
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Apollo 14 and subsequent 
spacecraft 
Figure 4. - Service module electrical 
power system vessels. 
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Block 11. 
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Figure 8. - Lunar module reaction 
control system vessels. 
Figure 7. - Lunar module ascent stage 
vessels. 
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Significant performance data on Apollo 
vessels have been generated during live 
propulsion-system tests at the NASA White 
Sands Test Facility (WSTF). Generally, a 
spacecraft vessel  receives 10 to 12 pressure 
cycles during its lifetime; however, many 
of the flight-type vessels at the WSTF have 
completed, without incident, more than 
350 cycles to or  above operating pressure.  
This high degree of success is attributed 
largely to the close control of vessel  fabri- 
cation and use that has been exercised on 
the Apollo Program and on the use of 
fracture-mechanics technology to predict 
safe vessel operation. 
Figure 9. - Lunar module descent stage 
vessels. 
TABLE 111. - SPACECRAFT PRESSURE-VESSEL QUALIFICATION 
I Test performed 
IVibration Tank function 
Service propulsion system 
Pressurization Block I 
Oxidizer Block I 
Fuel Block I 
Sump Block I1 
Gaseous nitrogen valve 
actuation 
Shock Burst 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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TABLE III. - SPACECRAFT PRESSURE-VESSEL QUALIFICATION - Continued 
Tank function 
CM reaction control system 
Pressurization 
Oxidizer 
Fuel 
SM reaction control system 
Pressurization 
Oxidizer 
Fuel 
Secondary vessels Block I1 
Oxidizera 
b Fuel 
Vibration 
Test performed 
aSame as CM reaction control system oxidizer. 
bSarne as CM reaction control system fuel. 
8 
~~~ 
Creep Cyclic Burst 
TABLE 111. - SPACECRAFT PRESSURE-VESSEL QUALIFICATION - Continued 
Tank function 
CM fuel cell 
Cryogenic oxygen 
Cryogenic hydrogen 
Gaseous nitrogen 
pressurization 
Oxygen surge 
LM reaction control systen 
Pressurization 
Oxidizer 
Fuel 
LM ascent propulsion 
system 
Pressurization 
Propellant 
Vibration 
Test performed 
Shock Creep Cyclic Burst 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X -- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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TABLE III. - SPACECRAFT PRESSURE-VESSEL QUALIFICATION - Concluded 
Tank function 
LM environmental control 
system 
Ascent stage gaseous 
oxygen 
Descent stage gaseous 
oxygen 
LM descent propulsion 
system 
Pressurization ambient 
Supercritical helium 
Propellant 
Vibration 
X 
X 
X -- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Test performed 
Shock Creep cyclic [ Burst 
QUALITY ASSURANCE 
The requirements for the quality-assurance programs of NASA contractors are 
delineated in NASA quality publication NPC 200-2. Applicable portions of this document 
were imposed by the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) on pressure-vessel manu- 
facturers at the beginning of hardware fabrication to ensure adequate control of process- 
ing and fabrication variables and to provide for  the availability of pertinent information 
and data concerning materials properties, deviations from requirements, Material Re- 
view Board (MRB) actions, and test data on each pressure vessel. 
Additional Requirements 
Because of problems that had been experienced from the beginning of vessel  fab- 
rication to early 1967, a decision was made to evaluate each vessel on each Apollo 
spacecraft for  flight worthiness before launch. Since that time, each Apollo pressure 
vessel  has been accompanied at vehicle delivery by a data package o r  "pedigree" that 
contains a manufacturing and processing history, including any discrepancies, and a 
pressurization data log. This requirement is in addition to those contained in the NASA 
quality publication. In this way, each vessel has been fully characterized for individual 
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evaluation of structural integrity and projected life capability. The following specific 
information is contained in each data package. 
1. Material and process specifications (submitted one time per generic vessel 
unless subsequently revised) 
2. Weld parameters and repair  history 
3. Chemical analysis of materials (including weld wire) 
4. Mechanical properties verification for  materials 
5. Certification of acceptance testing 
6. I Pressurization history (including fluids and times) 
7. Fluid exposure history (other than during pressurization) 
8. Discrepancy reports and reviews 
~ 
9. Nondestructive evaluation requirements and certification 
I 
1 I nspection and Discrepancy Reports 
Pressure  vessels have been inspected by the contractor a t  prescribed stages dur- 
ing fabrication and jointly inspected by contractor/NASA representatives at mandatory 
inspection points incorporated throughout vessel  fabrication and during subsequent sys- 
tem buildup. Discrepancy reports have been written for all anomalies o r  out-of- 
specification conditions detected during inspection o r  test. These discrepancy reports 
have been resolved by means of MRB action by responsible contractor and NASA repre- 
sentatives and a r e  part of each data package. Particularly serious discrepancies such 
as anomalies requiring detailed stress analysis or generation of empirical data for ma- 
terials evaluation have been resolved at higher levels but a r e  reflected in MRB 
documentation. 
Discrepancies originating at the prime contractor facilities can be classified gen- 
erally as scratches, dents, or  fit-up irregularities. Discrepancies originating at the 
subcontractor (vessel  manufacturer) facilities can be classified generally as machining 
er rors ,  scratches, dents, weld mismatch, weld porosity, dimensional anomalies, and, 
in one instance, a heat-treating e r ror .  The discrepancies have been random; no trends 
have been observed. 
In the first 13 command and service modules and nine lunar modules, 176 and 
123 vessel discrepancies, respectively, were found. The number of discrepancies, 
which is small  considering the total number of vessels (926) involved, includes many 
that were minor, such as superficial scratches. The number of vessel  discrepancies 
per spacecraft is shown in figures 10 and 11. 
I 
I 
11 
- Occurring at prime 0 Occurring at vessel vendor 
contractor 
24 
Spacecraft 
= Occurring at prime 0 Occurring at 
contractor vessel vendor 
111 112 113 114 
Spacecraft 
Figure 10. - Command and service 
module p r  essur e-vesse 1 
discrepancies. 
Figure 11. - Lunar module pressure- 
vessel  discrepancies . 
Nondest r uct i ve Test i ng 
The major NDT methods that have been used on Apollo vessels are ultrasonic in- 
spection of vessel details after the machining phases of fabrication, X-ray inspection, 
dye-penetrant inspection of welds, and dye-penetrant inspection of certain vessel  mem- 
brane surfaces. In addition, magnetic-particle inspection has been used on steel  ves- 
sels such as the lunar module descent stage gaseous oxygen vessel fabricated from 
DGAC steel. However, NDT has had some uncertainties that have introduced limita- 
tions in the use of these methods. For example, X-ray inspection can reveal surface 
and subsurface flaws, but flaw orientation can mask detection; whereas, penetrant in- 
spection detects only flaws that are open to the surface. In addition, routine inspection 
methods are dependent on the technique and training of the inspector and the nature of 
the flaw. For this reason, a precise limit could not be assigned to the minimum size 
of the flaw or to the population that would be detected by the inspection methods. 
In the case of some metallurgical flaws in the material, such as massive embrit- 
tled alpha in titanium or  titanium-hydride formation at welds, no satisfactory method 
of NDT is known. Such flaws are rare but have caused failure in pressure vessels. A 
neutron radiography technique has met with some success but requires development. 
Because of the uncertainties involved, NDT techniques have not been used alone 
to guarantee the integrity of pressure vessels. However, NDT techniques have been 
excellent means of monitoring fabrication control and ensuring production consistency 
and compliance with specification requirements. In th i s  respect, the application of 
NDT has facilitated the delivery of basically sound pressure vessels that have been con- 
trolled during use according to fracture-mechanics cri teria to ensure safe operation. 
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APPLl CATION OF FRACTURE-MECHAN I CS TECHNOLOGY 
The heat treatment of many pressure-vessel alloys to high strength levels and use 
at high stresses (low safety factors) results in a potentially increased sensitivity to 
small  f laws and various environments. Limitations in present nondestructive inspec - 
tion techniques could allow some relatively small flaws in the vessels to escape detec- 
tion. Therefore, attention had to be given to the method by which these flaws could 
propagate during ground testing and flight to ensure that such flaws would not result in 
failure of the pressure vessels. In 1967, approximately 3 years  after vessel fabrica- 
tion was begun, the vessel proof test became a valuable inspection technique using a 
fracture -mechanics approach and provided a baseline for postfabrication vessel analysis. 
The concepts of linear-elastic fracture mechanics (refs. 1 and 2) have been used 
to  examine the relationship between the maximum flaw size in a pressure vessel  that 
passes a proof test and the subsequent subcritical crack growth possible in ground-test 
and flight environments. 
The fracture-toughness/stress- intensity approach to fracture analysis generally 
has been accepted as the best available means of using fracture-mechanics technology 
in practical problems. The fracture-toughness parameter describes the maximum flaw 
size that a material can tolerate without rapid fracture when stressed to a prescribed 
level and is the value obtained for the stress-intensity factor that results in flaw insta- 
bility (structural failure). This value then is called the critical stress intensity or  
fracture toughness. Any stress intensity at a flaw that is less than the fracture- 
toughness value is subcritical. 
Fracture- toughness (apparent KIC) properties have been obtained for Apollo 
pressure-vessel materials. To investigate the compatibility of a pressure-vessel mate- 
rial with the fluid the vessel is intended to contain, stressed vessel-material specimens 
having cracks introduced of known size and shape have been exposed to the environment 
in question. The determination was made that, for each environment tested, an appar- 
ent threshold stress intensity Kth exists below which cracks in a given vessel alloy do 
not grow. The experimental threshold values for various Apollo vessel materials and 
environments are listed in table IV. Most of the threshold data in table IV have been 
developed for time exposures consistent with Apollo requirements. For missions longer 
than those of the Apollo Program, long time data must be obtained. A method for de- 
termining thresholds is described i n  reference 3. 
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TABLE IV. - THRESHOLD VALUES FOR APOLLO PRESSURE-VESSEL MATERIALS AND SELECTED ENVIRONMENTS 
Alloy 
ritaniuni 6AI-4V 
AM 350 
Inconel 718 
Titanium 5AI-2. 5Sn 
remperature. 
" F  
66 
70 
74 
78 
82 
86  
9 0  
94 
9 8  
102 
106 
110 
114 
118 
122 
126 
130 
134 
138 
142 
146 
150 
85 
85 
-297 
85 
Nitrogen 
tetroxide 
82 
81 
80 
79 
78 
77 
76 
74 
73 
7 1  
70 
68 
67 
65 
63 
52 
60 
58 
56 
55 
53 
51 
_ _  
_ _  _ _  
_ _  
Mononlrthy I 
hydrazine 
88 
82 
8 1  
81 
80 
80 
79 
78- 
77 
76 
75 
74 
73 
71 
70 
6R 
67 
65 
64 
62 
60 
59 
_ _  
_ _  _ _  
- -  
Threshold stress intensity Kth .  percent KIC 
Aerozine- 50 
83 
82 
81 
81 
8 0  
80 
79 
78 
77 
76 
75 
74 
73 
7 1  
7 0  
68 
67 
65 
64 
62 
60 
59 
- -  
_ _  _ _  
- _  
Trichlorolri- 
I luoroethane - 
Meld 
Air. helium. 
nitrogen. and 
oxygen 
TABLE V .  - APOLLO PRESSURE-VESSEL STRUCTURAL FAILURES 
Pressure  vessel 
SM 'RCS propellant 
SM/SPS propellant 
SM/SPS propellant 
SM/electrical power 
system gaseous 
nitrogen 
LES motor case 
LM descent stage 
gaseous oxygen 
LM descent stage 
propellant 
SM/electrical power 
system cryogenic 
oxygen 
Failures 
10 
a2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
a 1  
Cause 
~~ ~~ 
Nitrogen-tetroxide s t r e s s  
corrosion 
Methanol s t r e s s  corrosion 
Weld cracks (proof) 
Crack f rom embrittled weld 
repair  (leak test)  
Weld cracks plus incompatible 
fluid (water) (proof) 
Material defect plus incompatiblc 
fluid (water) (acceptance test) 
Massive alpha defect (proof) 
Internal ignition resulting in 
overpressurization failure 
Distilled 
water 
Date 
1965 to 1966 
October 1966 
October 1963 
April 1967 
August 1967 
June 1966 
March 1965 
April 1970 
Liquid 
oxygen 
14  
aVesseis were installed in spacecraft. 
1 0  
8 
Apparent threshold K, KIC = 0 6 * K t h  I w- 
= 4  
2 
0 
--.- - 
(a) Log time to failure as a function (b) Flaw size as a function of 
of Ki/%C. membrane s t ress .  
Figure 12. - Application of static fracture toughness and subcritical flaw growth 
to pressure-vessel analysis. 
aA 
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method of analyzing pressure vessels using the modified Irwin equation from refer- 
ence 2, safe operation could be predicted f rom the ratio of the proof pressure to the 
operating pressure and from the threshold o r  stress-intensity ratio required for crack 
growth. 
Although during flight the pressure in Apollo vessels is noncyclic, the effect of 
cyclic f law growth during leak checks and other pressure tests of Apollo vessels also 
had to be considered in vessel analysis. The maximum size flaw screened by the proof 
test was assumed to exist, and subcritical fatigue flaw growth caused by cyclic stress 
was evaluated and incorporated into each analysis. For example, the cyclic flaw-growth 
rate for 6A1-4V titanium alloy was determined experimentally in terms of stress inten- 
sity as a function of the number of cycles to failure a s  described in reference 4. From 
these data, a curve showing flaw growth rate per cycle at various Ki/KIC levels can 
be constructed and used in vessel analysis. 
To analyze a pressure vessel, three types of basic data a r e  needed. 
1. The fracture toughness KIC of the material 
2. The constant-stress flaw-growth threshold Kth in the environments to which 
the vessel  wi l l  be exposed 
3. The rate of cyclic growth 
Fracture-mechanics analyses of Apollo pressure vessels and determinations of 
environmental compatibility thresholds were initiated at  the MSC in late 1966. The ef- 
fort resulted in the initiation of pressurization restrictions and environmental exposure 
control of all vessels by mid- 1967. The fracture-mechanics cri teria and the techniques 
for analyzing and controlling Apollo pressure vessels were contractually imposed on the 
Apollo spacecraft contractors. The implementation of these specifications established 
common and consistent posffabrication evaluation procedures for all Apollo spacecraft 
pressure vessels. Basic overall considerations and guidelines for fracture control of 
pressure vessels a r e  presented in reference 5. 
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH VESSELS USED IN  
APOLLO SPACECRAFT 
The pressure-vessel problems experienced by the MSC and associated Apollo con- 
tractors a re  summarized in this section. Hardware problems that resulted in struc- 
tural failures a r e  listed in table V. Only three failures occurred on vessels installed 
in spacecraft: two during systems tes ts  and one during the flight of Apollo 13. Gen- 
erally, structural failures resulted from unexpected environmental-stress-cracking 
effects on the vessel  materials or  insufficient control of materials or  processes. Spe- 
cific problems and resolutions a r e  discussed in the following paragraphs. Potential 
problems that were not actually experienced but that required evaluation and resolution 
are discussed in the last three paragraphs in this section. 
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Specific Problems 
Nitrogen tetroxide incompatibility with 6A1- 4V titanium-alloy pressure vessels. - 
In 1965, a 6Al-4V titanium-alloy vessel containing nitrogen tetroxide (N204) under pres- 
sure  suffered localized stress-corrosion failure. Because of known reactions between 
titanium and other oxidizers, extensive test programs to establish compatibility between 
N204 and the vessel  alloy had been conducted successfully before 1965. Investigation of 
the cause of the failure resulted in the unexpected discovery that the alloy would undergo 
general stress corrosion in certain grades of N 2 0 4  (refs. 6 and 7). This discovery was 
particularly serious for the Apollo Program because 17 titanium vessels on each space- 
craft contain N204. 
The chemical makeup of the N204, primarily the nitric oxide (NO) content, deter- 
mined whether stress corrosion would occur. Previous tests had been conducted using 
N204 that had a relatively high NO content. Subsequent investigations showed that 
s t r e s s  corrosion would not occur with NO contents greater than 0.5 percent. The actual 
lower limit has not been defined. At the MSC, a specification was  generated for N204  
requiring an NO content of 0.8 f 0.2 percent to prevent recurrence of the problem. In 
addition, each lot of N 0 used for Apollo flights has been tested using precracked 
6A1-4V titanium-alloy specimens. These data have been analyzed using fracture- 
mechanics principles to verify that the stress-corrosion threshold was  sufficiently 
high to preclude environmental crack growth i n  flight. The application of fracture 
mechanics to Apollo vessels is discussed in a separate section. 
2 .4 
A s  a precautionary measure, each lot of fuel (Aerozine-50 and monomethyl hydra- 
zine) used for  Apollo flights has been tested using precracked specimens to verify that 
the stress-corrosion thresholds are acceptable because all possible combinations and 
levels of impurities permitted by specification may not have existed in earlier success- 
ful compatibility tests. 
Methanol incompatibility with 6Al-4V titanium-alloy pressure vessels. - Substi- 
tute fluids that simulate the specific gravity and flow characteristics of the propellants 
have been used to avoid the hazards associated with hypergolics when testing propulsion 
systems installed in spacecraft. Methanol was used to simulate Aerozine- 50 during 
flow tests of the SM propulsion system at  operating pressures.  
The first of two failures with methanol occurred on October 1, 1966, when a 
Block II SM vessel developed three separate leaks near the bottom girth weld while at 
normal operating pressure.  Originally, the cause of the failure appeared to be localized 
stress corrosion caused by an undetected materials anomaly. Twenty-four days later, 
a Block I vessel  containing methanol failed while pressurized to maximum operating 
pressure.  The failure was explosive, rupturing an adjacent vessel  and destroying the 
SM. Because the vessel  was not filled to capacity, the ullage contributed to the high 
level of damage. 
Investigation of the failures showed that pure anhydrous methanol is incompatible 
with the 6Al-4V titanium-alloy vessel material and results in severe stress-corrosion 
17 
attack (ref. 8). An SPS vessel that had successfully undergone tests with methanol was 
subjected to a proof pressure test and failed at 90 percent of the design proof level, 
showing that damage to  the vessel had occurred during methanol exposure although fail- 
ure  had not occurred. Therefore, methanol was eliminated from use in Apollo pressure 
vessels. 
Subsequently, with initiation of fracture-mechanics evaluation techniques, ;?11 
other fluids used in Apollo vessels were tested using precracked specimens. As a re- 
sult, trichloromonofluoromethane was restricted from use because of a relatively low 
stress-corrosion threshold although hardware failure had not occurred. 
Failure of a service propulsion -~ ~~~ system main propellant vessel  during proof test. - 
In 1963, during an  acceptance proof test, a failure of a Block I vessel occurred that was  
attributable to the development of an axial fracture in the heat-affected zone of a dome- 
to-cylinder weld. The fracture had transgranular cleavage of a type observed in 
conjunction with contamination of the 6Al-4V titanium alloy. The source of the contam- 
ination was not definitely established. However, the contamination probably occurred 
during welding o r  preparation for welding. The procedures and techniques were re- 
viewed and modified in the areas that would protect against contamination during the 
welding operation. Handling with clean-gloved hands was made a requirement, and a 
vapor-blast cleaning procedure was initiated shortly before welding to  ensure clean 
surfaces. No subsequent occurrences of contamination were detected in SPS propellant- 
vessel welds. 
Acceptance test failure of a lunar module descent gaseous oxygen vessel. - An LM 
descent stage gaseous oxygen pressure vessel  made of D6AC steel failed during accept- 
ance testing. Failure analysis showed that the origin of the failure was a preexisting 
crack in the radius of the mounting boss. During acceptance testing, which consisted 
of pressure cycling the vessel in a water bath, the crack grew. The D6AC steel  has a 
very low flaw-growth threshold in water. The tank manufacturer had been directed by 
the LM contractor not to use water as a pressurizing medium, Unfortunately, no men- 
tion was made of the medium in which the vessel  was immersed during testing, and the 
use of water in this application was not discovered before the failure. Another contrib- 
uting discrepancy was omission of inspection. The final machined boss a reas  received 
no detailed nondestructive testing or  inspection after machining. The size of the pre- 
existing crack in the failed vessel was of such magnitude that the vessel would have been 
rejected. 
Subsequently, water was replaced by a more compatible fluid, trichlorotrifluoro- 
ethane. All boss a reas  have been dye checked and magnaflux inspected for flaws; radio- 
graphic inspection was instituted on all domes before welding. Subsequent rigorous 
environmental tes ts  of sample vessels have completely qualified the design and use of 
the vessels on Apollo spacecraft. 
Failure of launch escape system motor cases during proof tests. - In 1967, two 
LES motor cases made of 4335V steel failed during proof testing. These cases,  and 
others in the same lot, had been welded with a filler wire having a higher carbon con- 
tent than had been used on previous lots, including the qualification cases.  This unau- 
thorized substitution made the cases more susceptible to  cracking in the weld areas and 
more susceptible to attack by water (the pressurizing fluid) while under stress. As a 
result, all cases in the affected lot were restricted from flight use. In subsequent lots, 
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oil was substituted for water as a pressurizing fluid. Quality-assurance requirements 
were revised to ensure that all fabrication steps and tests were accomplished in a sat- 
isfactory manner. Additional cases have been fabricated and tested under the new re-  
quirements with no recurrence of the problem. 
Massive alpha inclusions in 6A1-4V titanium alloy. - An LM descent propulsion 
system (DPS) vessel failed during a hydrostatic acceptance proof test at 267 psig, which 
was 74 percent of the required 360-psig proof pressure. A metallurgical investigation 
showed that the failure was caused by a localized microstructure abnormality consisting 
of "massive" alpha-phase structure in the upper dome. A second instance of massive 
alpha inclusion was detected in an LM ascent propulsion system (APS) vessel dome dur- 
ing a hand-blending phase of fabrication because of the comparative hardness. The 
dome was rejected and therefore never subjected to a proof test. 
Alpha inclusions of this sor t  a r e  rare but, if they are present, cannot be detected 
by the standard NDT techniques used. Reliance on the proof test to screen a gross con- 
dition in a finished pressure vessel has been the only practicable approach. Because 
the condition cannot be detected at the time of acceptance of the vessel  forgings, a con- 
siderable dollar loss is experienced with failure of a completed vessel. Although the 
occurrence of massive alpha is rare, the development of a suitable NDT technique may 
save costs and add confidence in the future use of titanium pressure vessels. 
Failure of an electrical power system gaseous nitrogen pressure vessel. - In 1967, 
an electrical power system (EPS) nitrogen vessel leaked in the girth weld during a pres- 
sure  decay test. Investigation of the failure disclosed that a repaired a rea  of the weld 
was contaminated with oxygen, resulting in an embrittled condition that was susceptible 
to crack initiation and growth under cyclic conditions. An evaluation of the weld repair 
technique and equipment showed that a high probability of oxygen contamination existed 
during weld repair. Investigation of other nitrogen tanks that had weld repairs verified 
that oxygen contamination was a problem. As a result, all EPS nitrogen vessels that 
had weld repairs  were deleted from the Apollo Program and the repair technique was  
modified. Contamination was not present in unrepaired vessels, and no subsequent 
problems have arisen when repairs have been required. 
Failure of a cryogenic oxygen vessel during the flight of Apollo 13. - In 
February 1970, the Apollo 13 spacecraft experienced a rapid loss of pressure in the 
number 2 liquid oxygen vessel, which is fabricated from Inconel 718 alloy. Essentially, 
the findings of the investigation of the Apollo 13 anomaly indicated that ignition occurred 
inside the vessel  at a point of degraded Teflon wire insulation. A fire propagated rap- 
idly inside the vessel, increasing the temperature and pressure until the strength capa- 
bility of the vessel  itself was exceeded and failure occurred. 
The structural capability of the oxygen vessel had been demonstrated in qualifica- 
tion tests and on previous Apollo flights. Inconel 718 was also known to be compatible 
with liquid oxygen. The fault existed in internal design where electrical components, 
Tef lon-coated wire, and terminals exposed directly to an oxidizing environment re-  
sulted in a hazard under certain adverse conditions. 
19 
Potential Problems 
Potential hydride formation in titanium-alloy-vessel welds made with unalloyed 
filler wire. - An explosion of a Saturn S-IVB stage during a test in March 1967 was at- 
tributed to the failure of a 6A1-4V titanium-alloy pressure vessel containing helium gas. 
The vessel had inadvertently been welded using unalloyed filler wire instead of the spec- 
ified 6Al-4V titanium-alloy filler wire. The failed weld had severe titanium-hydride 
banding that weakened the weld and ultimately resulted in vessel failure a t  operating 
s t ress .  Investigators of the failure postulated that the hydrides formed over a period 
of time in the region of the relatively abrupt change in hydrogen solubility between the 
6Al-4V titanium alloy and the essentially unalloyed titanium weld. It was  suggested that 
hydrogen migrated under s t ress  conditions from a region of high solubility (alloy vessel 
material) to a region of low solubility (unalloyed weld) and precipitated as titanium hy- 
drides upon reaching this zone. 
The latent occurrence of hydrides in the failed S-IVB vessels caused concern about 
the integrity of the SPS, DPS, and APS 6A1-4V titanium-alloy propellant vessels that a r e  
welded, by requirement, with unalloyed filler wire. A comprehensive program was un- 
dertaken to evaluate the Apollo welds, and it was determined that the concern about la- 
tent hydride formation in the Apollo welds was unwarranted. 
In summary, the S-IVB helium-vessel weld w a s  different geometrically and thicker 
(0.452 inch) than the Apollo welds (0..070 and 0.090 inch), which use unalloyed wire. In 
the Apollo welds (including repaired welds that have additional unalloyed filler wire), ap- 
parently sufficient alloying exists in the weld nugget to preclude a hydride problem. 
Conversely, some Apollo titanium vessels a r e  required by specification to be 
welded with alloy filler wire. These vessels a r e  relatively thick and more closely ap- 
proximate the geometry and conditions of the S - N B  weld. To ensure that these welds 
were made using alloy wire, an eddy-current technique was used that would distinguish 
between welds made with alloyed or unalloyed wire. No instances of wrong filler-wire 
use were detected. 
Potential alpha-stringer structure problem in 6A1-4V titanium alloy. - The 6A1-4V 
titanium alloy has been used for 47 vessels in the various Apollo spacecraft propulsion 
systems. Therefore, a potential problem with this material was reason for concern be- 
cause a serious general material anomaly would have a severe negative impact on the 
Apollo Program. 
Briefly, the metallographic structure of the alloy normally consists of a beta- 
phase matrix that has a dispersion of equiaxed alpha-phase "islands. " During tes ts  to 
verify the properties of a certain lot of forgings for  LM vessels, comparatively low 
elongation values were noted on a number of tensile test specimens taken from forging 
trim rings. Al l  other mechanical properties were within specification limits. Metallo- 
graphic examination showed that many of the alpha constituents in the structure had an 
elongated shape and were representative of alpha platelets o r  "stringers" rather than 
of the equiaxed alpha islands. A definite correlation was established between the low 
elongation and the presence of stringers. 
A program was conducted to evaluate normal and alpha-stringer structure under 
identical test conditions. Results of the tes ts  indicated that no significant differences 
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in behavior existed between the two structures except for ductility. The presence of 
alpha-stringer structure would not significantly affect the performance capability of the 
6Al-4V titanium-alloy pressure vessels as long as  elongation values were greater than 
the minimum specification limit of 8 percent. 
Acicular o r  elongated structure must not be confused with the "massive" or "low 
density" alpha- inclusion problem that is a threat to structural integrity. 
Potential failure of lunar module descent propulsion system vessels during flight. - 
Cyclic-flaw-growth analysis for the LM DPS vessels showed that the maximum flaw that 
c&ld exist x the vessek  after a normal proof test could grow during ground pressuriza- 
tions to a size that would give a s t r e s s  intensity above propellant threshold values during 
flight. To provide added cyclic life, a cryogenic liquid-nitrogen proof test was insti- 
tuted and added to  the existing ambient proof-test requirements. The cryogenic proof 
test has benefited by two changes in material properties that occur in the 6A1-4V tita- 
nium alloy with temperature. At -320" F, the alloy strength is increased, providing 
for a higher proof-test pressure (430 psi), and the fracture toughness of the alloy is 
slightly decreased, making the alloy sensitive to  smaller flaws during the proof test. 
Therefore, the cryogenic proof test screened to a flaw size much smaller than the am- 
bient proof test, providing increased flaw-growth capability during vessel use. This 
capability eased test restrictions and made contingency pressure cycles available for 
retests of the DPS if required. 
PRESSURE-VESSEL MANAGEMENT 
During the early phases of the Apollo Program (to the end of 1966), each NASA 
subsystem manager had sole responsibility for the pressure vessels in his respective 
subsystem. Because the background and training of the subsystem managers varied, 
inconsistencies evolved in pressure-vessel requirements and usage. 
As the Apollo Program progressed, many problems with pressure vessels re -  
quired specialized skills and training not possessed by the subsystem managers. 
included problems relating to metallurgical considerations (welding, heat treating, 
forging, and so forth) and service problems involving materials compatibility and safe 
operation analysis. 
These 
In 1967, a decision was made at the MSC that spacecraft pressure vessels would 
be treated as a unique subsystem with designated responsibility and that requirements 
and use  cr i ter ia  would be standardized. Definitions of pressure-vessel t e rms  also were 
standardized for  the Apollo Program, as presented in the appendix. An MSC technical 
monitor, who had the following general responsibilities, was appointed. 
1. Ensuring the structural integrity of pressure vessels 
2. Implementing fracture mechanics to  ensure that all flight vessels will meet 
mission requirements (pressures, temperatures, and number of cycles of 
pressurization) 
3. Ensuring that all fluids to which vessels a r e  exposed after acceptance tests 
are compatible with tank material ' 
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4 .  Ensuring that required structural safety factors a r e  maintained 
5.  Examining qualifications tests for adequacy 
6. Assessing fabrication procedures and methods 
7 .  Reviewing manufacturing discrepancies and resolutions 
8. Participating in the resolution of discrepancies where required 
9. Establishing allowable pressure/temperature relationships for vessels during 
each Apollo flight 
Single points of contact and responsibility for pressure vessels also were designated at  
the prime contractor facilities to interface with the MSC monitor, thus facilitating work- 
able pressure-vessel coordination and control. In addition, an MSC quality monitor was 
assigned to interface with the MSC technical monitor and the designated prime contractor 
point of contact. It w a s  the responsibility of the quality monitor to ensure contractor 
compliance with the quality-assurance data-package requirements. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
During the Apollo Program, pressure vessels have been critical to spacecraft 
operation and safety. In addition to stringent material and fabrication controls, an in- 
crease in the level of confidence associated with pressure-vessel use w a s  achieved by 
means of the application of fracture-mechanics cri teria to provide confidence in estab- 
lishing f luid/pressure/temperature limitations for pressure-vessel operations. 
Pressure-vessel safety factors as low as 1 . 5  have been shown to be practical, 
provided proper materials, processes, and usage evaluations a r e  made. Stringent 
material and fabrication control must be implemented to ensure consistency in metal- 
lurgical factors that, if varied, can significantly affect vessel  performance. Material 
properties may be highly sensitive to variations in composition, manufacturing methods, 
o r  service exposure. Unfortunately, metallurgical analysis of vessel  failures usually 
provided the first evidence of material factors adversely affecting performance. The 
reasons for the problems and steps to preclude them were generally "after the fact. '' 
An analysis of the application supplemented by required testing of material before de- 
sign, therefore, is of major importance. Compatibility of pressurants with the vessel  
material under use conditions must be established, and subsequent fluid and pressure 
control consistent with test  data is mandatory. Manufacturing methods and service 
environments must be evaluated thoroughly. The proper analysis and use  of materials 
for  pressure-vessel service can be achieved only by means of full coordination among 
systems engineers, designers, s t ress  analysts, and materials specialists in meeting 
systems requirements. Responsibility must be delegated to ensure that all are involved. 
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RECQMMENDATI ONS 
Based on Apollo spacecraft experience, the following recommendations a r e  made 
to reduce r isk and to ensure pressure-vessel integrity on future programs. 
1. Apply fracture-mechanics cri teria in pressure-vessel design. 
2. Evaluate design and materials selection of components to be used inside pres- 
sure  vessels for potential adverse conditions and effects. 
3. By use of the fracture-mechanics threshold approach, establish the compati- 
bility of the vessel materials with each fluid which will contact the material while 
stressed. 
4.  Actively protect against the use of improper o r  unauthorized materials during 
vessel fabrication. 
5.  Verify that weld repair techniques a r e  sufficient to provide repaired a reas  that 
have integrity equal to unrepaired welds. 
6. Establish consistent control requirements and criteria for regulation of 
pressurizations. 
7. Establish definite responsibility and authority in pressure-vessel activity. 
8. Exercise discretion when considering the elimination, because of cost savings, 
of any quality-control documentation requirements or  testing of pressure vessels. 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, March 3, 1972 
914-13-20-06-72 
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APPENDIX 
PRESS URE-VES SEL DEFl N I TI  ONS 
Pressure vessel: Vessel containing a compressed fluid with an energy equal to 
or  exceeding 14 250 ft-lb (0.01 pound trinitrotoluene equivalent) based on the adiabatic 
expansion of a perfect gas 
Normal operating pressure: Regulated pressure during system operation or  the 
nominal f i l l  value for pressurization tanks 
Regulator lockup pressure:  Back pressure at which the regulator completely 
stops the flow of pressurizing gas 
Maximum design operating pressure: Pressure as limited by relief provisions 
o r  maximum expected environment 
Proof pressure:  Pressure that each vessel must have sustained to be acceptable 
for  use in the spacecraft 
Design burst pressure: Maximum pressure that a vessel is designed to sustain 
.without rupture 
Safety factor: The ratio of design burst pressure to maximum design operating 
pressure 
Subsystem pressure verification test: A single pressure test  of the subsystem at 
a specified pressure above maximum design operating pressure to verify subsystem 
integrity 
Subsystem component installation pressure verification test: A pressure test 
conducted at  maximum design operating pressure o r  below to verify joints after replace- 
ment of components 
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